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of the "inconveniences" involved in the relationship of neigh-
borhood among those utilizing the oil and gas beneath the land.
It is significant that even without special articles corre-
sponding to those in the Louisiana Civil Code, the French rec-
ognize the relationship of neighborhood.3 It would be a pity if
Louisiana, by a narrow, restrictive interpretation of article 667
and its companion provisions took from its law a flexible, useful
tool by refusing to recognize the underlying general principle.
Certainly, if the Reymond decision stands, the court must be
aware and bear carefully in mind that it has impact on a large
number of areas of law. The danger of upsetting the jurispru-
dence cited by Justice Sanders is that it leaves the way open
for enterprising advocates to argue that in cases similar to those
formerly treated by use of article 667 the Reymond case means
that defendants can no longer be made responsible for their
actions. If the court is to embark on a course of distinguishing
ordinary risks of land use from ultra-hazardous ones and fixing
responsibility accordingly without use of article 667, it should
do so with full awareness and extreme care.
CORPORATIONS
Milton M. Harrison*
The Supreme Court of Louisiana in 1933 in Fudickar v.
Inabnet' held that when there are outstanding claims against a
dissolved corporation, which claims were disregarded by the
liquidator, persons possessing the claims have a right of action
against former stockholders who have become distributees of
the assets. Following the Fudickar case, in which the claim had
arisen from contract, the court in Ortego v. Nehi Bottling Works2
applied the same reasoning to a tort claim. Both of these de-
cisions recognized the absence of specific authority in the Busi-
ness Corporation Act8 for such a procedure and based the rulings
on Louisiana Civil Code article 21. In Collins v. Richland Avia-
tion Service, Inc.4 the Second Circuit Court of Appeal referred
to the revision in 1968 of our corporation statutes but followed
73. See Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louiana: The Obligations of Neighbor-
hood, 40 TuL. L. REv. 701 (1966).
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the Fudickar and Ortego cases because "the principles laid down
in these cases continue to be applicable today."5
In allowing claimant to pursue claims against the "dis-
tributees of the assets at least to the amount received from the
distribution," the court doubtless intended to limit individual
liability at most to the value of the assets of the corporation
each received.
INSURANCE
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Courts elsewhere have generally followed the rule that an
automobile liability insurer faced by several claimants may
settle with some of them although this may exhaust the insur-
ance fund or so deplete it that a subsequent judgment creditor
may be unable to collect the judgment in full. The rule requires
that the settlement be reasonable and made in good faith. The
supreme court followed this rule in Richard v. Southern Farm
Bureau Casualty Insurance Co.1 It rejected the plausible argu-
ment that upon the occurrence of the accident and injury the
insurer became bound to the plaintiff by virtue of the so-called
direct action statute2 for a proportionate amount of the insur-
ance proceeds. In support of its position, the court reminded
that settlements are favored by the law. It was not persuaded
that an alternate procedure, such as interpleader or concursus,
was available to the insurer. It may well be that a solution to
this problem, which is troublesome for both claimants and in-
surers, will have to be provided by legislation.
In Tyler v. Touro Infirmary the supreme court, following
an earlier court of appeal case, held that the failure of a nurse
assisting in an abdominal operation to count correctly the sponges
being removed from the patient was a simple administrative act
not amounting to the rendition of a professional service within
the meaning of an exclusionary clause in a policy issued to
Touro Infirmary. This interpretation of the clause drew dis-
sents from Justices Barham and Summers. While the position of
the dissenters seems more compatible with the language of the
5. id at 243.
6. Id.
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